This dissertation is an explanation and illustration of two sociological constructs, logics of action and logics of transaction. Applied to an analysis of historical changes in the American capital distribution chain, these constructs seem to shed some light on a specific sociological problem--the relationship between micro-level individual action and macro-level social change. At first, there is a discussion of the simple and direct logics of transaction between individual principal actors that characterized the colonial and early American economies. In the early nineteenth century, economic development required that the capital distribution chain be lengthened by the emergence of new types of intermediary actors. Two of these new types were corporations that were recognized in the law as "artificial persons" and individuals who acted as agents of other actors rather than principals for their own account. Next is a discussion of the history and evolution of what has been called managerial capitalism. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the need for coordination in large transportation and manufacturing organizations caused the rise to dominance of a powerful class of corporate managers, who operated according to a "trustee" logic of action. Managers were able to take control over the levers of economic power due to the inability of dispersed owners to act collectively. However, after the Second World War, ownership of America's corporations became concentrated in the hands of new actors in the capital distribution chain--institutional investors. Institutional investors developed three different logics of action, but all three were aimed at maximizing the returns to their beneficiary-owners. As Chapter Five documents, during the 1980s, institutional investors became aware that the "trustee" logic of management action was inconsistent with their goal of maximizing shareholder profits. To hold management accountable for the latter, institutional investors put some of their capital in the hands of corporate raiders and leveraged buyout sponsors who were active in the market for corporate control. Out of this struggle for power between institutional investors and managers, a new balance of power has emerged, along with a new logic of action--managing for shareholder value.