Nine experiments of timed odd-even judgments examined how parity and number magnitude are accessed from Arabic and verbal numerals. With Arabic numerals, Ss used the rightmost digit to access a store of semantic number knowledge. Verbal numerals went through an additional stage of transcoding to base 10. Magnitude information was automatically accessed from Arabic numerals. Large numbers preferentially elicited a rightward response, and small numbers a leftward response. The Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes effect depended only on relative number magnitude and was weaker or absent with letters or verbal numerals. Direction did not vary with handedness or hemispheric dominance but was linked to the direction of writing, as it faded or even reversed in right-to-left writing Iranian Ss. The results supported a modular architecture for number processing, with distinct but interconnected Arabic, verbal, and magnitude representations.

Observers often pair colours with earlier periods of motion. This observation has prompted the proposal that changes in colour are processed faster and perceived as occurring before physically coincident changes in direction—a brain-time account. Alternatively, it has been proposed that the sudden onset of a surface, or a direction reversal within a persistent surface, can trigger an analysis that determines the perceptual properties of the surface. Hypothetically, this analysis persists for some period of time and the consequences are perceived as having occurred when the analysis commenced—a post-dictive account. Hypotheses based upon these alternate accounts are contrasted in a series of experiments. It is shown that the optimal conditions for pairing specific combinations of colour and motion arise when colour changes are delayed relative to direction changes. In these conditions observers can pair more rapid oscillations of colour and motion and perceptual pairings are more systematic relative to when the changes in colour and direction are physically synchronous. It is also shown that, when pairing colour and motion, the sudden onset of a moving surface does not have the same consequences as a direction reversal within a persistent surface. These findings are consistent with the brain-time, but are inconsistent with the post-dictive, account of perceptual asynchrony.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is currently the mainstay of neuroimaging in cognitive neuroscience. Advances in scanner technology, image acquisition protocols, experimental design, and analysis methods promise to push forward fMRI from mere cartography to the true study of brain organization. However, fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of fMRI data abound, as the conclusions drawn often ignore the actual limitations of the methodology. Here I give an overview of the current state of fMRI, and draw on neuroimaging and physiological data to present the current understanding of the haemodynamic signals and the constraints they impose on neuroimaging data interpretation.

Recent psychophysical studies have been interpreted to indicate that the perception of motion temporally either lags or is synchronous with the perception of color. These results appear to be at odds with neurophysiological data, which show that the average response-onset latency is shorter in the cortical areas responsible for motion (e.g., MT and MST) than for color processing (e.g., V4). The purpose of this study was to compare the perceptual asynchrony between motion and color on two psychophysical tasks. In the color correspondence task, observers indicated the predominant color of an 18° × 18° field of colored dots when they moved in a specific direction. On each trial, the dots periodically changed color from red to green and moved cyclically at 15, 30 or 60 deg/s in two directions separated by 180°, 135°, 90° or 45°. In the temporal order judgment task, observers indicated whether a change in color occurred before or after a change in motion, within a single cycle of the moving-dot stimulus. In the color correspondence task, we found that the perceptual asynchrony between color and motion depends on the difference in directions within the motion cycle, but does not depend on the dot velocity. In the temporal order judgment task, the perceptual asynchrony is substantially shorter than for the color correspondence task, and does not depend on the change in motion direction or the dot velocity. These findings suggest that it is inappropriate to interpret previous psychophysical results as evidence that motion perception generally lags color perception. We discuss our data in the context of a “two-stage sustained-transient” functional model for the processing of various perceptual attributes.

Four experiments investigated the hypothesis that different attributes of a visual scene are processed by independent channels working asynchronously. Experiment 1 considered the attributes of colour, form, and movement of simple geometrical configurations. In each of three conditions, two of these attributes switched simultaneously between two fixed values (Green/Red, Circle/Square, Fixed/Moving). Participants indicated which of the two attributes changes was perceptually closer in time to a sound signal. Response probabilities varied as a function of the time of occurrence of the sound, showing that the processing of the movement channel is delayed with respect to the other two. A smaller but significant difference was also detected between the processing times for colour and form. Comparing Experiments 1 and 2 showed that movement velocity does not affect the delay with which movement onset is perceived with respect to colour. Experiment 3 contrasted colour and movement in the perception of a biological movement. The stimuli were video clips of a coloured ball being lifted by a hand. The colour of the ball changed a variable amount of time before or after the ball started moving. Participants indicated which of the two changes had occurred first. We found that, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, movement perception no longer lagged colour perception. Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that the disappearance of the asynchrony is due to perceptual anticipation. We discuss the implications of the results vis-à-vis current theories on perceptual binding and on the coding of dynamic events.

Psychophysical experiments with stimuli oscillating concurrently in colour and orientation revealed an apparently paradoxical dissociation between the perceived simultaneity of stimulus changes and the perceptual pairing of the events demarked by those changes. When subjects were required to report whether changes in colour and orientation were simultaneous, judgements were generally accurate within ±10 ms. When subjects were required to report which colour was paired predominantly with which orientation, judgements showed a systematic temporal bias of up to 50 ms in favour of colour. This dissociation between different temporal judgements concerning the same stimulus sequence is not predicted by any of the current models of binding in conscious vision. We propose an account of these data based on the temporal response properties of colour- and orientation-selective model neurons such that the perceived pairing of visual attributes is modelled as the cross-correlation of time-varying neural response profiles and thus reflects both neuronal latencies and the rate of rapid adaptation rather than simply the temporal pattern of responses to stimulus transitions.

Behavioural, neuro-anatomical and clinical evidence suggests that different aspects of the visual scene are processed separately, but the extent to which the processing is carried out along segregated and independent parallel pathways is still debated. Moreover, it is also unclear whether these aspects are processed at the same rate, and their neural correlates reach consciousness at the same time. An experiment investigated this issue in the case of three attributes of 2D displays: colour, form, and movement. There were three conditions, one for each possible pairing of these attributes. Stimuli were combinations of two values for each attribute (red/green, circle/square, fixed/moving). In each condition the stimuli changed twice in close temporal succession, each attribute switching asynchronously between the two possible values. The observer's task was to report which change had occurred first. Response probabilities were computed for 13 values of the asynchrony, and transformed into estimates of perception time with the help of a psychophysical model. The results showed that colour and form are processed almost simultaneously. By contrast, movement perception is delayed by about 50 ms. The implications of these findings vis à vis the so-called perceptual binding problem are discussed.

The brain processes distinct attributes such as colour and motion in anatomically largely segregated systems. Moreover, these two attributes are perceived with different latencies. Here, we show that the time required to bind these two attributes differs too. In psychophysical experiments, we determined minimal presentation times required to perceptually pair spatially separate pairs of stimuli consisting of colour or motion. Binding two colours required longer presentation times than binding the directions of two moving stimuli. Cross-attribute binding between colour and motion took longer than within-attribute binding. This was so even when the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion was compensated for, which accelerated colour–motion binding. Moreover, stimuli could be discriminated but not bound at fast presentation rates. Our results thus show that spatial binding is an attribute-specific process and faster within the same than across different attributes. Furthermore, the time required to bind attributes is independent of that required to process them, since colour is perceived before motion but requires longer time for binding. Finally, our results suggest that binding acts on attribute-specific neural representations of the stimuli at a late, perceptually explicit stage. These results lead us to conclude that spatial binding is separate from, and subsequent to, stimulus processing and that it is an attribute-dependent and post-conscious process.

The brain processes objects through a series of regions along the ventral visual pathway, but the circuitry subserving the analysis of specific complex forms remains unknown. One complex form category, faces, selectively activates six patches of cortex in the macaque ventral pathway. To identify the connectivity of these face patches, we used electrical microstimulation combined with simultaneous functional magnetic resonance imaging. Stimulation of each of four targeted face patches produced strong activation, specifically within a subset of the other face patches. Stimulation outside the face patches produced an activation pattern that spared the face patches. These results suggest that the face patches form a strongly and specifically interconnected hierarchical network.