The dictionary definition, and Dawkins's (1976) original conception of the meme, both include the idea that memes are copied from one person to another by imitation. We therefore need to be clear what is meant by imitation. Imitation is distinguished from contagion, individual learning and various kinds of non-imitative social learning such as stimulus enhancement, local enhancement and goal emulation. True imitation is extremely rare in animals other than humans, except for birdsong and dolphin vocalisation, suggesting that they can have few or no memes. I argue that more complex human cognitive processes, such as language, reading, scientific research and so on, all build in some way on the ability to imitate, and therefore all these processes are, or can be, memetic. When we are clear about the nature of imitation, it is obvious what does and does not count as a meme. I suggest that we stick to defining the meme as that which is passed on by imitation.

Critique - In my opinion, memetics has reached a crunch point. If, in the near future, it does not demonstrate that it can be more than merely a conceptual framework, it will be selected out. While it is true that many successful paradigms started out as such a framework and later moved on to become pivotal theories, it also true that many more have simply faded away. A framework for thinking about phenomena can be useful if it delivers new insights but, ultimately, if there are no usable results academics will look elsewhere.

A study of ancient and modern Near Eastern religious canons reveals the mutation, selection, and vertical transmission of fitness-enhancing textual units, defined as theistic memes. The earliest recorded theistic memes dealt with human fear of death and defined man's earliest relationship to god. Theistic memes that could theoretically affect fitness through selection and incorporation into religious canons included those dictating beliefs about (a) self-awareness in an unknown world, (b) strategies and behaviors toward others and within the nuclear family, and (c) appropriate sexual behaviors within marriage. Prohibition of aberrant sexual practices such as incest, adultery, homosexuality, bestiality, castration, and religious prostitution would have further maximized fitness. A remarkable mutation of the ancient Near Eastern theistic meme of child sacrifice is documented in the Old Testament in the story of Abraham and Isaac. Vertically transmitted theistic memes in the Hebrew canon were largely incorporated into Christian and Muslim religious canons (New Testament and Qur'an). Mutations of theistic memes during vertical transmission into these other canons allowed the same fitness-enhancing stability for the gentile and Arabic populations and are notable for the different strategies used to produce homogenized, orthodox canons.

In the aggregate, memes constitute human culture. Most are useful. But a whole class of memes (cults, ideologies, etc.) have no obvious replication drivers. Why are some humans highly susceptible to such memes? Evolutionary psychology is required to answer this question. Two major evolved psychological mechanisms emerge from the past to make us susceptible to cults. Capture-bonding exemplified by Patty Hearst and the Stockholm Syndrome is one. Attention-reward is the other. Attention is the way social primates measure status. Attention indicates status and is highly rewarding because it causes the release of brain chemicals such as dopamine and endorphins. Actions lead to Attention that releases Rewarding brain chemicals. Drugs shortcut attention in the Action-Attention-Reward (AAR) brain system and lead to the repeated behaviour we call addiction. Gambling also causes misfiring of the AAR pathway. Memes that manifest as cults hijack this brain reward system by inducing high levels of attention behaviour between cult members. People may become irresponsible on either cults or drugs sometimes resulting in severe damage to reproductive potential. Evolutionary psychology thus answers the question of why humans are susceptible to memes that do them and/or their potential for reproductive success damage. We evolved the psychological traits of capture-bonding and attention-reward that make us vulnerable for other maladaptive functions. We should be concerned about predator and pathogen memes and the mechanisms that make us vulnerable. The possibility of modeling important social factors contributing to the spread of dangerous cult memes is discussed. The history of the author’s experiences that led to understanding the connection between drugs and cults is related.

Evolutionary psychology and memetics are used to propose a model of war. Population growth leads to a resource crisis. An impending resource crisis activates a behavioral switch in humans allowing the build up of xenophobic or dehumanizing memes, which synchronizes attacks on neighboring tribes. Hamilton's criterion of inclusive fitness is invoked to account for the evolution of this species typical behavior. War as an evolved species typical behavior in the EEA for humans is discussed, first as an attack response and second as unprovoked attacks. Unprovoked attacks are proposed to require the build up of xenophobic or dehumanizing memes. Evolved brain mechanisms are proposed to cause these memes to become more common when the subject population anticipates "looming privation." The well-known reduction in the ability of humans to think rationally in war situations is explained in evolutionary terms as a divergence in interest between the individual and his genes. The problem of avoiding wars is examined in terms of these mechanisms. Population growth at a higher rate than economic growth is proposed as the causal factor for wars in the modern world. This model and the "excess males" model make different predictions about where future wars will start. The model is then applied to analyze current events.

Journal, free access, since 1997 - many articles.

John Wilkins (1998) This paper is intended as a focal article to raise philosophical issues about the nature of memes and memetic theory. To bring consistency to memetic analysis, researchers need to understand and agree upon the theoretical role of memes and the generalized model of evolution in which it occurs as a theoretical term. To help this, I have traced the source of Dawkins' conception of memes from GC Williams' evolutionary gene and through to the Hull-Dawkins Distinction between replicators and interactors and Hull's notion of lineages and the idea of an individual in biology. The complexity of biological modes of evolution suggests that conceptualizing memes as disease pathogens is not an alternative to evolutionary models of memetic development. I argue for a close and strict analogy between biology and memetics. I introduce the idea of a memetic individual or profile to clarify the ontology of memes and their ecologies. Some promising methods from biology and other disciplines such as Hamming Distance and Wagner groundplan divergence methods are suggested. A glossary of mainly biological technical terms used and introduced neologisms is included.

A "meme," of course, is an idea that functions in a mind the same way a gene or virus functions in the body. And an infectious idea (call it a "viral meme") may leap from mind to mind, much as viruses leap from body to body. When a meme catches on, it may crystallize whole schools of thought. Take the "black hole" meme, for instance. As physicist Brandon Carter has commented in Stephen Hawkings's A Brief History of Time: A Reader's Companion: "Things changed dramatically when John Wheeler invented the term [black hole]...Everybody adopted it, and from then on, people around the world, in Moscow, in America, in England, and elsewhere, could know they were speaking about the same thing." Once the "black hole" meme became commonplace, it became a handy source of metaphors for everything from illiteracy to the deficit. By 1990, I had noticed, something similar had happened to the Nazi-comparison meme. Sure, there are obvious topics in which the comparison recurs. In discussions about guns and the Second Amendment, for example, gun-control advocates are periodically reminded that Hitler banned personal weapons. And birth-control debates are frequently marked by pro-lifers' insistence that abortionists are engaging in mass murder, worse than that of Nazi death camps. And in any newsgroup in which censorship is discussed, someone inevitably raises the specter of Nazi book-burning.

Susan Blackmore suggests that the meme is an evolutionary replicator, defined as information copied from person to person by imitation. She argues that taking memes into account may provide a better understanding of human evolution in the following way. Memes appeared in human evolution when our ancestors became capable of imitation. From this time on two replicators, memes and genes, coevolved. Successful memes changed the selective environment, favouring genes for the ability to copy them. I have called this process memetic drive. Meme-gene coevolution produced a big brain that is especially good at copying certain kinds of memes. This is an example of the more general process in which a replicator and its replication machinery evolve together. The human brain has been designed not just for the benefit of human genes, but for the replication of memes. It is a selective imitation device.

Article by Scott Atran in Human Nature 12(4):351-381, 2001 Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although nonbiological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike in genetic replication, high-fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid "mutation" of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most apt to survive within a culture, most likely to recur in different cultures, and most disposed to cultural variation and elaboration.